2 authorities were willing to recognise the existence of new issues of inclusion in relation to their Roma populations. Although the measures we describe do something to remedy the policy vacuum, and control the worst excesses of racial politics, there are still important issues about the division of re sponsibilities between central and local governments for implementing them.
However, this is only one dilemma facing all the actors -the European Union(EU), the Czech authorities and the Roma themselves -in the present situation. On the one hand, it is well-recognised that, all over central and eastern Europe, the Roma have suffered social and economic exclusion. As the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner on National
Minorities has reported, in many countries the Roma have been decreed illegal residents on their own property, banished beyond municipal boundaries, and left outside the community of common concern (Van der Stoel, 2000, p.1). But -as one of the foremost applicants for EU membership -the Czech Republic has strong reasons for demonstrating its commitment to combating the exclusion of its Roma communities, and especially for countering the reproach to its progress towards democratic transformation that is constituted by high numbers of asylum applications to EU member states by its Roma citizens.
On the other hand, the Roma community in the Czech Republic has begun to organise itself and to have a voice, both locally and (to a lesser extent) nationally.
In this, it is in part sustained by EU funding and support, and it has increasingly developed the identity of a transnational ethnic minority, in which longstanding informal cross-border links are now being supplemented by formal, organisational connections. At the local level, Roma organisations are engaged with state and non-governmental organisations (NGO) structures to advance their interests, while at the same time promoting international activities and support networks.
The project involved interviews with the municipal authorities, and NGOs in three cities -Karlovy Vary, Olomouc and Pardubice. In each of these, the Roma Adviser to the local authority was one of the interviewees, together with a senior officer of the council to whom he or she was accountable. This allowed local strategies to be described, both by a policy maker and by the specialist officer responsible for direct liaison with the Roma community; it enabled us to compare these accounts, and the different versions of civic inclusion that they revealed. In 3 addition, we interviewed a number of officials who deal with NGOs, and representatives of those NGOs themselves, including some Roma organisations, in each city.
The research by Gabal Analysis and Consulting was conducted in nine other municipalities (including two districts of Prague). It involved interviews with 3 Roma Advisors, 8 Roma activists, 16 representatives of local governments, 5
Labour Office staff and 7 police officers. In addition a total of 18 Roma citizens who had emigrated once and 14 who had emigrated more than once were also interviewed. This is therefore a case study with many of the familiar elements of present day European social relations, but some unusual ones. Apart from immigrant communities, what distinguishes the most disadvantaged and marginal citizens of west European (and other First World) polities is their lack of mobility, and particularly their lack of access to advantageous transnational networks. By contrast, the Roma in central and eastern Europe increasingly identify as an international community, and see the option of emigration westwards as a possible solution to their exclusion from the national mainstream. Hence their associations are required to find a balance between struggling for local recognition and inclusion, maintaining national and transnational links, and involving members whose best individual short-term strategy may be exit rather than voice.
But this migration has had a considerable impact on the EU's emerging strategy for regulating immigration and asylum, and on the policies in these matters of member states. At the present time, the EU is attempting to bring together issues of economic migration (especially the recruitment of outside workers to meet labour shortages) and those of asylum, within a single framework (European Commission, 2000) . This indicates that -in the wake of the Amsterdam Treaty's provision (1997) for these issues to become a Community competence, as part of the programme for 'freedom, security and justice' (Articles 61-63) -the EU is moving from an almost entirely restrictive approach, based on securing external borders and limiting asylum applications, to one of 'accepting that immigration will continue and should be properly regulated, and working together to try to maximise its positive effects on the Union, for the migrants themselves and for the countries of origin ' (European Commission, 2000, summary) .
However, the opening up of legal channels for economic migration is seen as legitimating tough measures, both in relation to clandestine entries and trafficking, and through 'fast -track' asylum procedures, dispersing applicants to camps, giving only 'in-kind' support, and imposing 'safe third -country' rules (Düvell and Jordan, 2001 ). Thus EU policy distinguishes strongly between wanted recruits (who meet labour-market and demographic requirements), and unwanted migrants (who come through their own decisions, with or without good humanitarian reasons).
For many member states, this distinction is even more strongly upheld, for instance in the UK, where the first small party of Czech Roma asylum seekers sparked the 'moral panic' about asylum issues in 1999-2000.
But the EU has a delicate balancing act in relation to Roma asylum-seeking, especially from a first-wave applicant country in the enlargement process, like the Czech Republic. Accession requires harmonisation of standards in relation to human rights; the flight of Roma to EU member states points the finger of accusation at the Czech government for colluding in human rights abuses. Hence strategies for integration became relevant to the accession process (CastleKanerova, 2001 ).
Furthermore, the case study illustrates a special instance of the dilemmas of policies for social cohesion in a globalising economic context. In the Czech Republic as in the other post-communist countries of central and eastern Europe, the fall in living standards after 1989 was fairly evenly shared by all classes (outside a few prosperous international cities like Prague.) The exceptions to this rule were the overlapping old political and new business élites, together with the mafia, who suddenly became very rich, and the Roma, who lost their economic role and many of their social rights.
Partly because the lack of affordable housing precluded residential polarisation, partly because of continuing low salaries together with rising living costs, a kind of equal misery prevailed among the mainstream, with little evidence of an emerging white underclass (Götting, 1997) . This has now changed, and the exclusion of the Roma ethnic minority can be seen as one of the mechanisms by which mainstream solidarity is maintained in the aftermath of post -1989 changes.
Indeed, this exclusion has reflected in an exaggerated way what has happened in west European countries, but most obviously in the UK. As the compulsory collective solidarities of the welfare state era have weakened, mainstream citizens have gained individual freedoms, and opportunities to pursue strategies, based on narrower mutualities, with others of like incomes and tastes (Jordan, 1996; .
All the problems associated with erosion of collective restraints on competition have been projected on to the losers in these processes -poor people and other marginal minorities -who are blamed for misusing their freedoms, exploiting the benevolence of the state, and preying on mainstream citizens. This fails to recognise how mainstream strategies and lifestyles actively disadvantage and exclude, and how the actions of the excluded are largely understandable as 'best respons es' to that of the mainstream.
In the case of the Roma in central and eastern Europe, these processes of blame and rejection build on very longstanding prejudices and conflicts, and allow the remobilisation of racist stereotypes. Hence policies for civic inclusion are reaffirmed to counter pervasive resentments and moral assumptions. While some of the restraints of the socialist era continue to operate both institutionally and informally among mainstream citizens, the Roma community bears the brunt of economic and social change.
BACKGROUND: STATE AND THE CIVIL SOCIETY
It is an often-repeated truism of the democratisation process in central and eastern
Europe that this involves the construction of a civil society that was absent under communism (Tilly, 1997) . In the Czech Republic, this largely mistakes the problem; what was absent was a public space for critical dialogue between organisations of citizens and the state, for interest-group representation and for mobilisation and new activities around new issues. What did exist were numerous associations of many kinds, only some of which were directly sponsored by the state or the Communist Party; and even the latter varied greatly from one locality to the next in the extent to which they reflected official orthodoxies.
As a result of extermination policies during the Second World War, there were very few Roma left in the Czech lands when the Communists came to power. Roma were compulsorily resettled from Slovakia in the 1950s and 1960s, implementing a decision to spread their population as thinly and evenly as possible over the whole of Czechoslovakia ( Van der Stoel, 2000, pp. 21-2) . This was part of a programme for forced assimilation, within the forced industrialisation and urbanisation of the Republic, and especially of the backward Slovak lands. In 1958, the law decreed that the Roma were not an ethnic group, but people 'maintaining a markedly different demographic structure', and enforced school attendance, settlement and employment in a fixed location (Fraser, 1995, p 277) . But such policies were not wholly inconsistent with state support for development of a distinctive cultural identity, and Roma associations both existed and received resources for pursuing cultural activities and links. Hence the bonds of community organisation and kinship with Slovak extended families were not lost, even though Roma were compulsorily recast as miners and factory workers and as dwellers in socialiststyle tower blocks during this era. Roma families continued to migrate from the Slovak to the Czech lands during the Communist period. The Roma had formal political representation in order for the regime to claim that equality at the economic and other levels had been achieved.
Since 1989, the transformation of Czech c ivil society reflects many aspects of the legacy. On the one hand, the relationship between the state (both central and local government) and the NGOs has continued to be characterised by formalism and legal regulation. Law and proclamation rather than detailed engagement have characterised the attempt to change attitudes and increase participation and the sense of civic responsibility. On the other hand, there has been a vigorous growth of new associations, both those partly funded by the EU or west European NGOs, and those reflecting local mobilisations around particular issues. In part this reflects the retreat of the state from its former controlling and providing role, and illustrates the international trend towards involving NGOs as service providers filling this vacuum (Deacon, 2000) . But the Czech pattern of these developments (as elsewhere in Central and eastern Europe) is of fragmented, localised organisations, ill-informed about each other's activities, and with little networking or concerted action (partly due to shortages in resources). Bohemian towns found that well-dressed Roma citizens were turned away from over half of such facilities (Petrova, 1998) Hence the Czech situation presented a rather different combination of civility and civil associations on the one hand, and civicness and civic organisation on the other, from what existed in western Euro pe. The democratisation process seemed to require a transition between the first pair of concepts and the second. Czech society was characterised by rather good manners, considerateness and obedience to the rules, at least in its public and visible aspect s, and outside the political elite, during the Communist era. We have argued that civil associations were relatively numerous and healthy though they lacked the opportunity and will to participate in the realm of politics, or to influence policy at national or local levels. The Czech transition to democracy would -on this account -require something more than a growth in participation in, or formation of, civil associations.
It would demand an active engagement between public-sector agencies and policy makers and organisations in the non-governmental sector, in which the missing links are forged, the capacity and desire of citizens to participate in public affairs is promoted, and concern for the common good fostered. In the case of the Roma, the requirement is obviously strongest, because of the combined impact of economic marginalisation and racial discrimination and oppression.
Yet the context of socio-economic change in the Czech Republic is unfavourable to any of these developments. On the one hand, the withdrawal of the state from its controlling and providing role has required civil society organisations (both old and new) to step into social service roles. Hence local and national government agencies come to substitute financial for political controls, as the main source of funding for such activities. Although there may be more interactions between public authorities and NGOs, the former are little more accountable to the latter than before and dependency stifles real dialogue. This situation is by no means 9 unique to the post -communist countries, and can be seen as part of global tendency in social policy (Deacon, 2000) .
As far as the Roma are concerned, the dramatic deterioration in their economic circumstances since 1989 has been accompanied by a growth in exclusionary practices of all kinds, not only within the public sector, but in civil society organisations, in businesses and in the informal actions of citizens. Greater activism and political awareness are thus a response to far more explicit forms of disadvantage and exclusion, and in this the Roma community draws on resources (both material and cultural) from outside the Czech Republic to mobilise resistance, and thus as involved in transnational collective mobilisation. In a sense, the Roma might be seen as more involved in civic activity than the mainstream Czech community -but from such a disadvantageous situation that their participation is balanced by incentives or pressures to leave the field altogether, by emigrating as asylum seekers. The transnational context therefore both feeds the voice option (resources for mobilising as a politically-aware ethnic minority) and the exit option (emigration).
EXIT OR VOICE? ISSUES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
The dilemma of the Roma over whether to take action as individuals and/or families (migration, exit) or to participate in collective action, in dialogue with local authorities (participation, voice) raises important issues about social capital, and its relevance for civic inclusion. Specifically, it focuses attention on the legacy of communism in the polity and civil society, and on how the cultural capital of Roma communities bears on the new requirements of civic values and behaviour in the democratisation process. Since de Toqueville (1836), mainstream liberal political theory has tended to view civil-society networks and associations as contributing to reciprocity, trust and civic competence, a tradition that fed into Putnam's (1993) work, and through this into the present literature. However, globalisation and transnational governance cast doubt on assumptions about the virtuous circle between both civil and civic competence, and reciprocity and political legitimacy (Jordan, 1998) . In particular, the networks and associations used by poor people to survive and to resist the consequences of their economic marginalisation and social exclusion do not feed into democratic practice, and give rise to enforcement action, through the criminal justice system and other regulatory agencies (Jordan, 1996, chs. 4 and 5) . This in turn can be seen as contributing to social division, polarisation and conflict.
Both the special conditions of post-communist political cultures, and the cultural traditions of the Roma themselves, add dimensions to these issues. Social capital is beneficial for some socially desirable ends, and harmful for others (Solow, 2000) ; when there is a sudden shift in both normative and structural institutions, as happened in 1989, what is seen as socially desirable behaviour changes, and hence the consequences of social capital are changed. Part of the legacy of communism was organisational failure. The authorities behaved in ways that were not accountable or predictable; rules were bent or broken, and things were done through bribes or personal contacts. Hence informal networks were involved in protecting their members from the intrusion of state agencies, or exploiting these agencies, in substituting for the functions of formal organisations, or subverting them (Rose, 2000, p.149 ).
The Czech Republic was not a country in which things are done through bribes and corruption to the same degree as in other parts of central and eastern Europe.
Rose's research on how citizens acted to get their wages paid, benefits and pensions, access to unive rsities, hospitals and child care, found that around half of the Russians surveyed relied on such 'antimodern' methods, compared with about a quarter of Czechs.
Czechs tend to be less likely to think that nothing can be done than former Soviet citizens. Big differences arise because Czechs are more likely to rely on markets or personalise and plead with bureaucrats to expedite their demands. (Rose, 2000, pp.164-5) What was missing under the old regime was any form of interest group politics arising from civil society, or many connections between the associational life that did flourish (around many different activities, cultural and recreational) and the structures of political authority. What did exist, however, were informal networks that crossed boundaries and enabled people to get things done without overt reliance on corruption. Civil -society organisations were not training grounds for local or national politics; the norms of trust and co-operation generated by associations did not spill over into political culture; and there were few overt linkages between associational and political networks. This helps explain our finding that new NGOs in the field of social provision were isolated from each other, and that the local authorities sought to organise them, rather than draw on their social capital for their own purposes.
Indeed, under Communism the Roma were one of the few groups in Czech society with formally representative institutions; hence they were (albeit hierarchically) linked into the political system under communism. However, they were by no means socially integrated (despite being housed and employed), and their lack of access to decent education meant that because of their unskilled roles, they were very vulnerable to the shock effect of markets on the economy. Hence it is possible to understand the recent attempts by local authorities to engage directly with Roma associations as a revival of the communist system, as much as a move towards greater partnership with civil society organisations. It also recognised the Roma organisations as 'enterprises' in an economic sense, rather than NGOs (non-profit organisations, as well as non-governmental, and hence not civic in the communist tradition).
Although these innovations have therefore reopened the voice option for the Roma, their associations start from a very disadvantaged position, in relation to their own potential membership's capacities for mobilisation, as well as in relation to the authorities. In the time between 1989 and the beginning of these initiatives (1997), the economic and social exclusion of Roma populations had led to cultural practices characteristic of other groups to experience such treatment. Roma resorted to the 'weapons of the weak' -covert action consisting of informal economic activity, petty crime, and maximising welfare claims, based on underground networks of co-operation, information and subversion (Scott, 1985; 1990; Jordan, 1994) . All these practices had been 'perfected' under communism by the general population, and are common to groups in similar structural situations in western Europe (Jordan, 1996, ch.6) . They also represent an alternative to overt political action, because they are based around the perception of higher returns for informal methods, secrecy and covert rule-breaking (Jordan, 1998) . This perception was clearly realistic in the Czech Republic during those years, since the government insisted that their difficulties were 'social problems' requiring no structural remedies, and racist groups used any occasion that made them visible as opportunities to attack them.
In addition to this, the Roma tradition of mobility and withdrawal from any such threat represented another alternative to collective engagement with the political authorities. The exit option through migration was doubly attractive, especially to better-educated and better-off Roma. On the one hand, travel was regarded as a benefit rather than a cost, and Roma families could call on cultural resources for mobility from many generations. On the other, most west European societies were more attractive than the hostile environment they faced in the Czech Republicthey found the 'greater ethnic diversity and openness' (Gabal Analysis and Consulting, 2000, p.31) congenial by contrast. When they were rejected on asylum applications, they simply found strategies for keeping return options open, and then for setting off to apply somewhere else.
LOCAL STRATEGIES FOR CIVIC INCLUSION
The context of the interviews that informed our case study was the appointment of Roma advisers (liaison officers) by municipal authorities since 1998, as the main measure taken under the central government's programme for addressing Roma exclusion. But the political climate for our case study was made more explosive by the emigration of large numbers of Roma families seeking asylum in the EU and Canada. This was a response to, but in turn also generated, a series of local crises, such as the one in Usti nad Labem, where a dividing wall was built to segregate the Roma from the other population. The Maticni wall became not only a symbol of resentment towards the Roma but represented a clash between the central government and the municipal self-government. Hence the issues of exclusion/inclusion were at the forefront of Czech local politics at the time.
All the local authority staff were keen to emphasise that they were not biased against the Roma, and that mechanisms for dialogue with Roma organisations were in place. But all the non-Roma officials interviewed made it clear that their strategy for preventing any new crises was to stay in control of such interactions. This reflected their relationship with the NGO sector, which was still relatively weak, inexperienced, depoliticised and in a state of competition organisations.
The common ground for all the local actors in each municipality was a desire to attract EU funding for improvements and 'good causes', including Roma inclusion.
But this could contribute to the competitive environment, because many grassroots organisations were too small and isolated to qualify for grants.
The three municipalities comprised: Karlovy Vary, a medium-sized town in Western Bohemia, relatively prosperous because of its proximity to Germany, with a tradition of glass-making and a world-famous spa; Olomouc, the second-most historic city in the Czech Republic, just re-emerging from obscurity, with signs of economic and architectural rejuvenation, and the relocation of some central governmental institutions; and Pardubice, a spa in Northern Bohemia, semiindustrial, with an above-average percentage of Roma population. Each had a local strategy that had evolved from recent responses to its social and economic conditions. 14 These variations took place within a set of common features, which can be summarised as follows: -firstly, there was a deep level of fragmentation and even alienation between the local authority's structures and the NGO sector at the municipal level; -secondly, both the mainstream organisations and those of the Roma, had begun to develop forms of communication and co-operation through engaging in the non-state sector joint local activities, yet this was still marked by past political practices, particularly paternalistic and centralist decision making.
-thirdly, pressure from the EU, appeared to be filtering down to the municipal level, especially concerning social inclusion, citizenship rights and minority representation; this, however, was usually reflected in token actions in search of local funding; -fourthly, there was continued denial of problems such as social conflict, discrimination and racism, and a shying away from social responsibility to tackle these by the municipal authorities; -fifthly, in times of difficulties, the local authorities relied on solutions from the state; the NGO sector was left with very thin back up support; and -lastly, policies of civic inclusion were in their beginnings, often interpreted in a formalistic way, with the NGO sector itself lacking in networking skills, political strength and influence.
Karlovy Vary
The interviews in Karlovy Vary indicated a tacit co-operation between the municipal authorities and the Roma community. The Roma adviser, a rather strong personality, was expected to inform the local authority of any 'problems'. The local authorities wanted to be seen to be doing the 'right' thing in terms of meeting the needs of the excluded minority. This, however, can be related to the apparent prestige that the town can bargain with elsewhere, when it comes to proving itself to be progressive.
What was evident was that the municipal authorities act in a semi-authoritarian manner, calling upon the Roma adviser when needed, but keeping the rank and file of the Roma community out in the cold. The Roma adviser reported a case of a proposed community centre for the Roma that was being promised, a building and even money was found (externally through the British Know How Fund), yet the city council imposed a 'dictat' on the way of disposing of the money. The municipal authorities 'grant and approve', rather than engage. The council was also insensitive to where the community centre should be, not taking on board the local hostilities among the residents, and dissociating itself from the present or potential future conflict. The Roma adviser seemed to be battling alone for the Roma ethnic minority's rights as equal citizens at the municipal level as far as housing and employment. He is prepared to argue cases in the court, yet even the courts are 'deaf' to Roma rights, sticking to their traditional attitude of 'don't tell us how we should make decisions; everyone is equal here'.
The local authority is unable to tackle the issues of racism, discrimination and prejudice. 'There is a general lack of political will'. Some of the 'rank and file' members of the Roma community that were also interviewed confirmed that when it comes to crucial meetings with the municipal authorities, they are not invited, and worse, are being treated with a derisory attitude. 'They [the munic ipal authorities] are the big bosses. They let us wait for hours, don't inform us... They have written us off. The council does not want to solve the Roma issues. Often, the authorities themselves want to send us away, suggest that we emigrate, force us to leave...'.
The local authorities representatives, on the other hand, reported their increased efforts to meet the Roma community's needs, with added comments such as: 'The Roma organisations are being privileged at the moment', and claiming that they have 'excellent relationship with the local Roma NGO's', and: 'We don't have any major local problems here'. At the same time, one of the social assistance officers reported that to deal with the Roma families is difficult because 'They are often abusive'. This is a clear legacy of the past attitudes and approaches, with little effort being made to bridge the years' old social gulf. There seemed to be no recognition of the potential civic and political role that the Roma community wished to play.
Olomouc
In the city of Olomouc, the pattern of paternalistic attitudes, particularly between the city council representatives and the Roma adviser was even more clearly visible and expressed. He was being appointed as a protégé of the head of the social services. She placed 'personal confidence' in him, expecting that he would become her 'right hand man'. When he asserted his independence, he was being charged with disobedience and embezzlement, and eventually (after the completion of these interviews), he was forced to resign. The Roma adviser admitted that his post was 'without any real bite'. 'We cannot implement any He also added that, ' the trouble is that the town's authorities and the regional authorities are united by old friendship networks'. This was a reference to the lack of independence between the two tiers of local government, the supposedly autonomous local municipal council and the regional state related authorities.
Hence, the scope for lobbying or finding allies in the battle for extending the Roma citizenship participation seems to be limited by this factor. However, the Roma adviser also pointed out that his post is really a product of a 'governmental decree', passed under the influence from the EU. This is an interesting area for further investigation into the impact of EU recommendations and legislation (on equal rights) on the regional and local authorities in the newly developing democracies.
The view from the municipal authorities side was one of self-satisfaction. 'We cooperate with NGOs on a large number of projects... They are indispensable... The NGO sector is doing an invaluable work that the state cannot do'. This admission was self-serving, as the key areas cited where the non-governmental sector was most valued were crime prevention and youth work. There was also a clearly expressed reliance on funding for projects on the EU. At the same time it was admitted that funding for smaller scale projects was difficult to secure, and small towns like Olomouc are inexperienced in getting the right funding where applicants must have an EU partner. Thus, connections to the EU are seen more in terms of money rather t han developing networks. This in some ways confirms the actual isolationism of the municipal authorities from grass roots activities, where, if the right support was given, flourishing of new contacts and connections from 'bottom up' could be the right way of breaking down the traditional centralism as well as enhancing the civic participation all around. At present, the NGOs' activities are thus limited to the areas where the local authorities needs help to deal with the officially identified 'hot spots ' of social tension.
Pardubice
The interviews in the town of Pardubice were set up in a more formal way, as Pardubice aimed to live up to its claim that they are a 'trouble-free' town and a 'success story' as far as inclusion of the Roma ethnic minority into the mainstream of the city's life is concerned. Thus, the meeting with the council representatives and the Roma advisor took place jointly in the same municipal building room, and the local press was informed of the meeting with the 'EU person'. The meeting was a well structured PR exercise. The initial claim was that 'there is no racial problem here'. The background to that is that the town's authorities as early as 1995 made an approach to the Roma community, appealing for calm after a riot invo lving extremist right-wing group that fuelled racial hatred. From that time, formal communication channels were established between the town's authorities and the Roma community. Clearly, this strategy has worked. Yet, the formal role of the Roma adviser in Pardubice, as in the other two locations, was riddled with ambiguities. He was a well respected figure in the official circles, whilst he gave the impression that he has also gained respect among the Roma community at large. Through the interviews, however, it became perceptible that he 'plays the game', and the trust among the Roma was not as solid as claimed. This ambivalence of 'marrying' the official role with the community grass roots role was, in many respects, at the centre of future questions about the direction the civil society in the Czech Republic will take.
The Roma adviser testified to Roma being included in some respect in the local affairs. He specifically mentioned the contract between the municipal authorities and Roma firms who do cleaning jobs for the council. 'We can do public works', he stated, but in the next sentence he betrayed his own allegiance by saying 'There is work everywhere, but not many want to work'. This could be a replica of a statement from a Labour Exchange official. The additional comment, however, pointed out at the changes that the local community experiences since the market economy took hold of the local and central economy. 'Previously, we worked.
Today, we are not even allowed to work. Then, we are labelled as bad. There is a real struggle for work nowadays, and this leads to prejudice... People will go on strike rather than work alongside of Roma... Now, there is an escalation of conflict between the 'whites' and us, Roma'. The contrast between the two statements and the contradiction as far as the content of these two pictures of reality, one the 'official', and the other in defence of his 'own people', never occurred to him. The statements more clearly than in the other interviews, revealed the split role that the Roma adviser carries.
Further to that, the Roma adviser commented on the generally good co-operation with the municipal authorities, once more showing the two sides of his ambivalent position. 'I am tough on people. I want sanctions imposed. It is not popular with the Roma... I keep an eye on things'; hence his own popularity with the council.
Another insight was gained when the Roma adviser commented on the increasing fragmentation of the Roma community itself, and the erosion of family structures that takes place under pressure from the new economic reality. 'Now, the Roma are registering for places in old age pensioners' homes', the Roma advisor stated.
'This never happened before. Now, we are simply unable to keep our parents with us anymore... The family can't afford things, many are economically too weak'.
The case of Pardubice also strongly pointed in the direction of the Roma organisations themselves being fragmented, isolated and often in rivalry with each other. Reference was made to the national Roma umbrella organisation that was being accused of embezzling money, making false claims to success, or simply keeping its information secret. 'They let us down... It failed all the way... Three people from the original organisation now work higher up', were the comments about the national Roma NGO. Distrust at the level of Roma community itself clearly relates to the fragmentation experienced by virtually all grass roots Roma groups as far as their full inclusion in the local or national decision-making process is concerned. Their attitudes are a reflection of wider social context in which they operate. Thus, to mobilise local civic resources will take time and further confidence-building on all sides.
One striking missing featu re from the interviewers was the notion that any of these interactions relate to democratisation or contribute to that process. As far as accession to the EU, which was seen as a source of funding for local initiatives, rather than as providing a set of standards or aspirations for good practice, the only reference made was in connection to pressure exercised by the EU in establishing Roma representation in the role of Roma advisors. For the Roma, local engagement was perceived as an alternative to migration; while they derived collective identity and cultural resources from the pan-European nature of their links as an ethnic minority, they did not draw on these for claims for inclusion at the local level. Similarly, the local authority staff did not refer to the EU as a source for ideas of almost inclusionary practices, or use references to EU standards in their attempts to justify the particular strategies that they were adopting.
In order to understand these omissions, we need to consider how the EU has responded to the Roma issue in the overall context of the enlargement process, under which countries like the Czech Republic are required to accept the whole package of the acquis communautaire , and postpone negotiations until granted membership.
ENLARGEMENT AND THE EUROPEAN UNION'S IMMIGRATION STRATEGY
The 'missing' actor in these strategic interactions is the European Union. Roma asylum -seeking raises dilemmas for EU policy of an acute form in relation to three domains -enlargement, immigration and social protection. Enlargement implies harmonisation with EU law and administrative regulation for the applicant countries, but it also involves issues of political culture and practice -the spirit in which such rules are implemented, including equal opportunities and antidiscriminatory measures (Castle-Kanerova and Jordan, 2001) .
When an interviewee in the Gabal study reported that officials in the UK did not shout at Roma like officials in the Czech Republic did, he was saying that -even though his application for asylum had been refused -he recognised an important qualitative difference in administrative cultures that was relevant for human rights heading' yet casting them as 'safe countries' (Lavenex, 1999) . This has required them to establish appropriate border control regimes, and reception facilities for asylum seekers -a specially onerous task for Hungary, because of its proximity to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. But for the Czech Republic, this has also included the need to provide for Roma from Slovakia seeking asylum in their country, and for Roma being returned ('voluntarily' or Admission policies for economic migrants must enable the EU to respond quickly and efficiently to labour market requirements at national, regional and local level, recognising the complex and rapidly changing nature of these requirements and consequently of the need for greater mobility between Member States for incoming migrants. (sec. 3.3).
However, the same Communication made it clear t hat the EU gave priority to flexibility, mobility and the 'economic, social and cultural' needs of member states.
EU legislation should therefore provide a flexible overall scheme based on a limited number of statuses designed so as to facilitate rather than create barriers to the admission of economic migrants. The aim should be to give a secure legal status for temporary workers who intend to return to their countries of origin, while at the same time providing a pathway eventually to a permanent status for those who risk to stay and who meet certain criteria. (sec.3.4.
2)
The Roma clearly do not meet these criteria; part of the rationale for opening up legal channels for those recruited to EU labour markets was to justify tougher measures being taken in the field of asylum. The gradual emergence (through 'benchmarking' among member states) of a 'European model' for asylum procedures, reception facilities and 'fast tracking' of decisions, can be seen as the evolution of restrictive solutions to the 'crisis' of the 1990s. This consists of dispersed accommodation (often in camps), restriction of social benefits, in-kind assistance and abbreviated adjudications. Dispersal to highly visible institutions in peripheral regions without ethnic minority settle ments, exposing them to xenophobic attacks, had failed to deter applications, as long as asylum was the only channel for legal migration. But none of the new measures to accommodate labour recruitment will apply to Roma seeking to migrate, so they continue to challenge EU common policies. The most that is offered in the concerted strategy is the undertaking to combat discrimination, racism and xenophobia more energetically in the EU (European Commission 2000, sec.2).
Suspicion of Roma migrants links with the third theme, the attempt to 'modernise social protection' in the EU. Here the goal is to overcome the barriers to labourmarket participation that have bedevilled the European welfare states, and given rise to regimes of 'welfare without work ' (Esping-Andersen, 1996) . The goal of 'making work pay' and drawing larger proportions of the population into employment has preoccupied the Third Way governments of the USA, UK and Australia (Jordan, 1998; Lister, 2000) ; but it has also led to policies for 'activation'
and 'inclusion' that have been comparatively successful in Denmark (Jordan and Loftager, 2001; Cox, 1998) , the Netherlands (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997; Hemerijck, 2001) , and Ireland (Jordan et al, 2000) . The EU Concerted Strategy on Modernisin g Social Protection is an attempt to balance the security provided by high replacement rates (requiring high social insurance contributions) with the expansion of low-paid, low-productivity, labour-intensive employment (European Commision 1999b). In the wider context, it can be seen as part of the same project -to transform regulatory systems in line with the requirements of a globalised economy, in which individual autonomy and responsibility, mobility and enterprise, are all promoted, yet order and managed efficiency are maintained (Düvell and Jordan, 2001 ).
The Roma are a challenge to this project, because their version of mobility and enterprise does not fit into the EU's version of order and managed efficiency.
They have many of the characteristics of the domestic populations that the strategy is aiming to activate (high rates of unemployment and benefits claims), and they expose a fundamental contradiction in the strategy. Expenditure on 'making work pay' and investing in training for claimants (DM 45 billion per year in Germany) has failed to mobilise the 18 million unemployed claimants in the EU, and the recruitment drive reveals the extent of continuing demand for willing
workers. Yet this recruitment is to be highly selective, and at the discretion of the EU member states' governments. Roma are perceived as unsuitable candidates, and in their case discrimination against them as would-be migrants is based on their race (Young, 2001) .
The EU wants to use migration to introduce elements of labour-market flexibility into its 'modernisation' programme that its efforts to transform social protection systems are failing to achieve. In the Communication on a Concerted Strategy for Immigration, and in other EC documents, there are frequent references to 'flexible social policy' and mobility, but these are not intended to apply to Roma migrants.
Instead, applicant governments are to be encouraged to provide policies for integrating them at home. This could be an excellent opportunity for the EU to take a more pro -active and positive stance in linking such integration to demands that the human rights and anti-discrimination practices in central and eastern
Europe are put into place as part of this integration. (Castle -Kanerova, 2001) 24
CONCLUSIONS
The issues of civic inclusion are often presented as if what is at stake is either improving democratic participation and accountability (Putnam, 1993) , or strengthening social cohesion and reducing wasteful conflicts (Giddens, 1998) .
Advocates of greater civic activism emphasise the benefits in terms of social capital and good governance; those who emphasise community and inclusion point to the lost potentialities and hidden costs of excessive individualism and competition. Both accounts tend to underestimate the extent to which globalisation now offers attractive alternatives to strategies of collective action in national polities which were advantageous in the era of Keynesianism and welfare states.
What is unusual about the Czech situation is that the most disadvantaged group, the Roma, have such an option, along with the most privileged (young graduates with language skills) who can move abroad. Both our project and the research by Gabal Analysis and Consulting reveal that Roma communities actively engage in discussion and debate about the relative merits of collective action in the local polity, and emigration as asylum seekers. Furthermore, they are able to switch between them strategically; and because travelling is seen as a benefit rather than 
